That massacre, with pregnant women butchered and bodies thrown into the village water well, shocked the Arab population of Palestine, prompting a refugee flight of fear. He was being wooed by Israel and the US, and treated like a distinguished head of state, for making peace with Israel. The Arab League reacted by removing Egypt as a member and moving its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. He signed the accords after 12 days of intense negotiations in Sept.
Despite the disconcerting reality on the ground, Sadat went ahead and signed a formal peace treaty with Israel at the White House on March 26, , officially ending the conflict between the two countries. When you look at the five fundamentals of the accord, only two were actually achieved. Egypt did get the Sinai Peninsula back, under demilitarized conditions, and the two countries ended their state of war and established diplomatic relations.
A page from the Arab News archive from Sept. In , the settler population was only 75, By , it tripled to , Ironically, while the accords were supposed to create an environment of hope and optimism, the failure to advance them beyond the return of the Sinai created a fatalism that fueled extremism. They have to speak for themselves. Still, in the final hours before the agreement, Carter had tried to get Begin to agree on a freeze on West Bank and Gaza settlements that would last through the negotiating period.
The one big mistake at Camp David, recalled William Quandt , then a staff member on the National Security Council, was that Carter thought he had a verbal agreement on a settlement freeze from Begin and relayed the breakthrough to Sadat who then signed the accords. I have no reflection on his integrity or honesty. Today, there are 10 times or more that number of settlers in the West Bank. Throughout these negotiations, with all of the skepticism and setbacks, with periods of frustration and, at times, utter hopelessness, the three delegations persisted and prevailed.
Every panelist attributed the ultimate success of Camp David to the personal attention and perseverance of President Carter who was unrelenting in his quest for peace. Samuel Lewis , then U. Ambassador to Israel, underscored the importance of determined leaders. Whenever we hit the wall, we immediately turned around and tried another technique…new constructions and new ideas.
Carter recalled the many disagreements over definitions and schedules but said he resolutely stuck to his strategy of negotiating with a single document for all involved parties. Six months after signing the Camp David Accords, after further negotiations mediated by the United States, Begin and Sadat signed a peace treaty that remains binding and unbroken to this day.
In , President Carter received the award, in part for his role at Camp David. But, rather than seizing the momentum from Camp David, conference panelists pointed out, future leaders instead missed a key opportunity to resolve the dispute before Israeli-Palestinian relations got further complicated by the burgeoning number of Palestinian refugees and disputed Jewish settlements in the ensuing two decades. Brzezinski challenged that both sides need a willing partner.
But Israelis and Palestinians have hit major bumps in the road map and talks now center on whether and how to revive it. Conference panelists, given their experience brokering the peace deal with Egypt, offered their comments and suggestions. Brzezinski supported following the road map and outlined four critical steps: clarifying for all parties the endpoint; accelerating the process; pressuring both sides to comply; and, reinforcing the peace, perhaps by having an international presence.
Quandt disagreed with reviving the road map. He instead suggested presenting a plan that the Israeli and Palestinian publics would vote on in a referendum and, if the leaders agree, the international community would pledge support for economic development, Palestinian restitution, etc. Despite decades of hostility before the agreement, changes in leadership, and occasional points of tension since, the public has adapted to a peace that serves its interests.
The Multinational Force and Observers MFO is the institution created by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the agreement and to prevent violations. It was designed by the Israelis and Egyptians for their particular security situation and is limited in scope to the Sinai Peninsula.
The success of the MFO structure rests on several mutually reinforcing pillars, both structural and substantive. Its mandate is specific and unambiguous. Both parties feel a sense of ownership and investment in the longevity and stability of the peace they negotiated. Steady U. All of these are buttressed by an effective command structure and streamlined decision-making and communication channels.
The net result is a mechanism respected by both sides as reliable and professional, and in which both see the value in sustaining. In the wake of the failed second Camp David summit between Israelis and Palestinians in July , there was significant and detailed examination of its potential.
However, in the current context, when the fate of the two-state solution is uncertain, the viability of such a formula is difficult to assess. The operating assumptions for considering an MFO model for Israelis and Palestinians mirror the pillars of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. These include a two-state solution in which all major claims are resolved, all borders are final, Israeli forces eventually withdraw from the West Bank, and both sides accept international force presence and assistance.
Getting to this formula will not be an easy lift. Israel, despite the success of the MFO, and grounded in experience elsewhere, remains cynical about the effectiveness of international forces in guarding against threats to its territory and is not inclined to entrust its security to anyone else.
Palestinians have shown a willingness to accept a third-party presence in a future Palestinian state but regard the prospect as an interim measure. The particular complexities and asymmetries of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict relative to what existed between Israel and Egypt are likely to make squaring these circles an even heavier lift than what was improbably accomplished at Camp David in That said, the latter offers lessons in the power of leadership and political will to unlock the seemingly intractable and open the door to the kind of agreement that could be sustained and strengthened by an MFO-style arrangement.
Today, despite what seems to be gradually improving ties between certain Arab states and Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a ceiling to full and formalized Arab-Israeli peace. It is almost inevitable, therefore, that bold leadership, exemplified by Sadat-style gestures and the reciprocating courage of Begin will be required to open the door to a negotiated peace.
Within that framework, the real game-changing gestures must come from Israeli and Palestinian leaders. If the chasm of trust between the parties today seems deeper than ever, the good news is that public opinion is dynamic.
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